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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
SCIRICA, Circuit Judge. 
 
This case involves an interpretation of the Freedom of 
Information Act, 5 U.S.C.A. S 552 (West 1996 & Supp. 
1997). The issue on appeal is the continuing vitality of our 
opinion in International Bhd. of Elec. Workers Local Union 
No. 5 v. United States Dep't of Hous. and Urban Dev. , 852 
F.2d 87 (3d Cir. 1988) ("IBEW"). In IBEW, we held the 
Freedom of Information Act's S 552(b)(6) privacy exemption 
could not prevent disclosure of certain wage related 
information which the union used to measure compliance 
with the Davis-Bacon Act, 40 U.S.C.A. SS 276a-276a-7 
(West 1986 & Supp. 1997). The specific issue here requires 
us to once again balance the public interest served by 
disclosure against the harm resulting from the invasion of 
privacy in light of intervening decisions from the Supreme 
Court. 
 
I. 
 
A. 
 
Plaintiff-appellee, the Sheet Metal Workers' International 
Association, Local Union No. 19, monitors "whether federal 
agencies are enforcing private contractors' compliance with 
[the Davis-Bacon Act]." Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n 
Local Union No. 19 v. United States Dep't of Veterans 
Affairs, No. 96-4120, 1997 WL 34681, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 
28, 1997). "The Davis-Bacon Act requires that the wages of 
work[ers] on a Government construction project shall be 
`not less' than the `minimum wages' specified in a schedule 
furnished by the Secretary of Labor." United States v. 
Binghamton Const. Co., 347 U.S. 171, 172, reh'g denied, 
347 U.S. 940 (1954). Essentially, it provides "that all 
laborers and mechanics working on federally funded 
construction projects be paid not less than the prevailing 
wage in the locality in which the work is performed." IBEW, 
852 F.2d at 88. 
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"The Davis-Bacon Act is enforced in part through the 
Copeland Act, 40 U.S.C. S 276c, which requires federal 
contractors to submit weekly payrolls to the government." 
Id. The Copeland Act authorizes the Secretary of Labor to 
make "reasonable regulations for contractors and 
subcontractors engaged in the construction, prosecution, 
completion or repair of public buildings . . . including a 
provision that each contractor and subcontractor shall 
furnish weekly a statement with respect to wages paid each 
employee during the preceding week." 40 U.S.C.A. S 276c 
(West 1986). 
 
Contractors' payrolls must contain: "the name, address, 
and Social Security number of each such worker, his or her 
correct classification, hourly rates of wages paid (including 
rates of contributions or costs anticipated for bonafide 
fringe benefits or cash equivalents thereof . . . ), daily and 
weekly number of hours worked, deductions made and 
actual wages paid." 26 C.F.R. S 5.5(a)(3)(I) (1997). The 
public agency hiring the contractor must ensure 
compliance with these regulations. See 26 C.F.R. S 5.6(a)(3) 
("The federal agency shall cause such investigations to be 
made as may be necessary to assure compliance with the 
labor standards clauses required by S 5.5 and the 
applicable statutes listed in S 5.1"). 
 
The union contends it uses this information (1) to 
ascertain whether the contractor is inflating the numbers of 
employees actually working on the job site; (2) to compare 
the employees' listed job classifications with the work 
actually performed on the job site; (3) to determine whether 
the contractor is using the same employee for two different 
classifications on the same job; (4) to check the consistency 
over time of the rate of pay for a particular classification; (5) 
to determine whether the employer is using the proper ratio 
of mechanics to journeymen apprentices; and (6) to 
determine if the apprentices are properly registered with the 
State Director of Apprenticeship and Training, whether they 
are working out of their classification, and whether they are 
receiving the proper rate of pay. (See App. at 50-52 (Clagg 
Aff. PP 10-12)). 
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B. 
 
Boro Developers, Inc. is a construction company who 
contracted with defendant-appellant, the United States 
Department of Veterans Affairs. The Department of 
Veterans Affairs hired Boro to assist in the renovation of 
the Veterans Administration hospital in Wilmington, 
Delaware. 
 
On January 16, 1996, the union requested from the 
Department of Veterans Affairs (1) copies of the certified 
payrolls Boro submitted for the hospital renovation, (2) 
copies of apprentice registration forms, and (3) "the 
applicable Prevailing Wage determination established by the 
Department of Labor" for the hospital renovation. (App. at 
8 (Compl. Ex. A)).1 By letter dated February 20, 1996, the 
Department of Veterans Affairs responded to the union's 
request: "Due to privacy act considerations, names, Social 
Security numbers, fringe benefits, etc. [will] be redacted." 
(App. at 11 (Compl. Ex. B)). 
 
The union renewed its request on March 6, 1996. (See 
App. at 13 (Compl. Ex. C)). A formal appeal was filed on 
March 20, 1996 through counsel, reiterating the union's 
demand: "the [Department of Veterans Affairs] is entitled 
under the FOIA only to redact Social Security numbers 
. . . . All other information . . . including employees' names, 
addresses, job classifications and pay rates, must be 
provided in full." (App. at 16-17 (Compl. Ex. D)). 
 
On May 3, 1996, the Department of Veterans Affairs 
issued its final denial, relying primarily on SS 552(b)(6) and 
552(b)(7)(C) of the Freedom of Information Act: 
 
        Some of the information contained on the records 
       you seek is personal in nature [S 552(b)(6)], and the 
       records themselves are considered to be law 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. "[A]pprentice registration forms show which employees of the 
contractor have been registered as apprentices by the State." (App. at 50 
(Clagg Aff. P 9)). The Prevailing Wage Determination is "a list of all 
applicable pay rates for various job classifications . . . . [assessed] by 
the 
Department of Labor Wage and Hour Division after conducting a survey 
of local private contractors to determine what the`prevailing rate' is." 
(Id. 
(Clagg Aff. P 7)). 
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       enforcement records [S 552(b)(7)(C)]. The personal 
       information in the requested records includes the 
       record subjects' names and Social Security numbers, 
       their home addresses, sex and racial status, together 
       with a breakout of their payroll withholdings and net 
       pay. As records containing such personal information, 
       these records fall within the scope of records that are 
       subject to the aforementioned exemptions. 
 
* * * 
 
       the wages paid for work performed, the rates and job 
       classifications of the payees should be available to the 
       public. 
 
* * * 
 
       please understand that individual identifiers, such as 
       names, and Social Security numbers, addresses, sex, 
       race, payroll withholdings and net pay, will be 
       redacted. 
 
(App. at 40-41(Compl. Ex. E)). 
 
C. 
 
On June 3, 1996, the union filed a complaint in the 
United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania seeking disclosure under the Freedom of 
Information Act. (See App. at 4-5 (Compl.P 13)). The 
complaint requested, inter alia, (1) that the court order the 
Department of Veterans Affairs to provide the requested 
documents; (2) that, in the alternative, the Department of 
Veterans Affairs furnish the court with the records for an in 
camera inspection to determine if any exemptions apply; 
and (3) that the court enter a declaratory judgment that the 
Department of Veterans Affairs cannot rely on S 552(b)(6) as 
authority for withholding the requested information. (App. 
at 5-6 (Compl. Wherefore Cl.)). 
 
The Department of Veterans Affairs moved for summary 
judgment, arguing SS 552(b)(6) and 552(b)(7)(C) prohibit the 
disclosure of the requested information. The unionfiled a 
cross-motion for summary judgment. The district court 
granted the union's cross-motion for summary judgment 
and denied the Department of Veterans Affairs's motion. 
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The able district judge described his task as follows: "to 
balance the privacy interest of the Boro employees in 
nondisclosure of the payroll information against`the extent 
to which disclosure would shed light on an agency's 
performance of its statutory duties or otherwise let citizens 
know what their government is up to.' " Sheet Metal 
Workers', Local No. 19, 1997 WL 34681, at *4 (citation 
omitted). Relying largely on our well reasoned opinion in 
IBEW, the district court nonetheless recognized a string of 
recent appellate decisions which questioned the rationale of 
that decision:2 
 
        These cases, of course, cannot overrule IBEW. Only 
       the Supreme Court and the Third Circuit can overrule 
       that case, and neither court has done so expressly. The 
       position taken by the Second, Ninth, Tenth, and 
       District of Columbia circuits cannot bind this court. 
 
* * * 
 
        The court recognizes that the case law in this area is 
       evolving as a result of Supreme Court decisions, and 
       that Courts of Appeals have taken a closer look at 
       employees' privacy interests in light of the Supreme 
       Court's discussion of the issue. This court, however, is 
       bound by the rulings of the Third Circuit until that 
       court changes its position or its decisions are overruled 
       by the Supreme Court. The court concludes that the 
       IBEW decision controls this case, has not been 
       overruled, and continues to be the law in this circuit. 
 
        The fact that the court has concluded that it is 
       bound by the rule set forth in IBEW does not mean 
       that the court agrees with the Third Circuit's balancing 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. See United States Dep't of Defense, et al. v. Federal Labor Relations 
Auth., 510 U.S. 487 (1994); United States Dep't of Justice et al. v. 
Reporters Committee For Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749 (1989); 
Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n Local No. 9 v. United States Air Force, 63 
F.3d 994 (10th Cir. 1995); Painting Indus. of Haw. Market Recovery Fund 
v. United States Dep't of the Air Force, 26 F.3d 1479 (9th Cir. 1994); 
Painting and Drywall Work Preservation Fund v. Department of Hous. and 
Urban Dev., 936 F.2d 1300 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (considering IBEW doubtful 
authority); Hopkins v. United States Dep't of Hous. and Urban Dev., 929 
F.2d 81 (2d Cir. 1991) (same). 
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       of interests in that case, especially as it relates to 
       disclosure of the employees' names and home 
       addresses. The court finds considerable merit in the 
       position taken by the Second, Ninth, Tenth, and 
       District of Columbia circuits and suggests that the 
       Third Circuit consider using the facts of this case to 
       reexamine IBEW in light of these decisions. 
 
Sheet Metal Workers', Local No. 19, 1997 WL 34681, at *6 
& n.1 (citations omitted). The Department of Veterans 
Affairs appealed. 
 
II. 
 
Generally, we apply a two-tiered test when reviewing an 
order granting summary judgment in proceedings seeking 
disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act: 
 
       The reviewing court must first decide whether the 
       district court had an adequate factual basis for its 
       determination. 
 
* * * 
 
       [I]t must then decide whether that determination was 
       clearly erroneous. Under the clearly erroneous 
       standard, this Court may reverse only if the findings 
       are unsupported by substantial evidence, lack 
       adequate evidentiary support in the record, are against 
       the clear weight of the evidence or where the district 
       court has misapprehended the weight of the evidence. 
       The two tiered standard of review of the district court's 
       determination that a particular document is or is not 
       properly subject to exemption does not, of course, 
       preclude plenary review of issues of law. 
 
McDonnell v. United States, 4 F.3d 1227, 1242 (3d Cir. 
1993) (citations omitted).3 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. This standard does not receive uniform application among the courts 
of appeals. See Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Assoc. Local No. 9 v. United 
States Air Force, 63 F.3d 994, 997 (10th Cir. 1995) (recognizing "there 
may be some disagreement among other courts as to the precise 
standard of review of a grant of summary judgment in a FOIA case"). 
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In this case, however, the district court based its grant of 
summary judgment on our ruling in International Bhd. of 
Elec. Workers Local Union No. 5 v. United States Dep't of 
Hous. and Urban Dev., 852 F.2d 87 (3d Cir. 1988). In that 
event, we exercise plenary review. McDonnell, 4 F.3d at 
1242. 
 
III. 
 
A. 
 
"The Freedom of Information Act was enacted to facilitate 
public access to Government documents." Sheet Metal 
Workers Int'l Assoc. Local No. 9 v. United States Air Force, 
63 F.3d 994, 996 (10th Cir. 1995). See also Hopkins v. 
United States Dep't of Housing and Urban Dev., 929 F.2d 
81, 83 (2d Cir. 1991) (the Freedom of Information Act "was 
enacted in 1966 to create a broad right of access to official 
information") (citation omitted). There is a presumption in 
favor of disclosure, and "FOIA expressly places the burden 
`on the agency to sustain its action.' " United States Dep't of 
Justice et al. v. Reporters Committee for Freedom of the 
Press, et al., 489 U.S. 749, 755 (1988) (citations omitted). 
See also United States Dep't of Defense et al. v. Federal 
Labor Relations Auth., 510 U.S. 487, 494 (1994) 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
Compare Painting Indus. of Haw. Market Recovery Fund v. United States 
Dep't of the Air Force, 26 F.3d 1479, 1482 (9th Cir. 1994) ("we apply a 
two-step standard of review to FOIA cases. We determine whether the 
district court had an adequate factual basis on which to make its 
decision and, if so, review for clear error the district court's finding 
that 
the documents were exempt") (citation omitted), with, McDonnell, 4 F.3d 
at 1241-42 ("summary judgment in an FOIA case`takes on a unique 
configuration.' As a result, the familiar standard of appellate review 
promulgated by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) does not apply"), 
and, Petroleum Info. Corp. v. United States Dep't of the Interior, 976 
F.2d 
1429, 1433 & n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1992) ("This circuit applies in FOIA cases 
the same standard of appellate review applicable to generally to 
summary judgments. The Ninth Circuit, we note, applies a clearly 
erroneous standard to district court determinations on summary 
judgment in FOIA cases") (citation omitted). 
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("disclosure, not secrecy, is the dominant objective of 
FOIA") (citation omitted). 
 
"Public access to government information is not, however, 
`all encompassing.' " Sheet Metal Workers', Local No. 9, 63 
F.3d at 996 (citation omitted). The act "reflects a general 
philosophy of full agency disclosure unless information is 
exempted under clearly delineated statutory language." 
Dep't of Defense, 510 U.S. at 494 (citations omitted). 
 
"Congress exempted nine categories of documents from 
the FOIA's broad disclosure requirements." Reporters 
Committee, 489 U.S. at 755. The two categories that are 
relevant here, SS 552(b)(6) and (b)(7)(C), exclude from 
disclosure requirements: 
 
       (6) personnel and medical files and similar files the 
       disclosure of which would constitute a clearly 
       unwarranted invasion of personal privacy; and (7) 
       records or information compiled for law enforcement 
       purposes, but only to the extent that the production of 
       such law enforcement records or information . . . (C) 
       could reasonably be expected to constitute an 
       unwarranted invasion of personal privacy. 
 
5 U.S.C. S 552(b)(6), (b)(7)(C). 
 
Resolution of a case under S 552(b)(6) "depends on a 
discrete inquiry: whether the disclosure of [the requested 
information] would constitute a clearly unwarranted 
invasion of personal privacy of the bargaining unit 
employees within the meaning of the FOIA." Dep't of 
Defense, 510 U.S. at 495. As the Supreme Court held: 
 
       First, in evaluating whether a request for information 
       lies within the scope of a FOIA exemption . . . a court 
       must balance the public interest in disclosure against 
       the interest Congress intended the exemption to 
       protect. 
 
        Second, the only relevant `public interest in 
       disclosure' to be weighed in this balance is the extent 
       to which disclosure would serve the `core purpose of 
       the FOIA,' which is `contributing significantly to public 
       understanding of the operations or activities of the 
       government.' 
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* * * 
 
        Third, whether an invasion of privacy is warranted 
       cannot turn on the purposes for which the request for 
       information is made. Because `Congress clearly 
       intended' the FOIA `to give any member of the public as 
       much right to disclosure as one with a special interest 
       in a particular document,' except in certain cases 
       involving claims of privilege, `the identity of the 
       requesting party has no bearing on the merits of his or 
       her FOIA request.' 
 
Id. at 495-96 (citations omitted). 
 
With respect to the privacy interest protected: 
 
       the cases sometimes characterized as protecting 
       `privacy' have in fact involved at least two different 
       kinds of interests. One is the individual interest in 
       avoiding disclosure of personal matters, and another is 
       the interest in independence in making certain kinds of 
       important decisions . . . . both the common law and 
       the literal understandings of privacy encompass the 
       individual's control of information concerning his or 
       her person. 
 
Reporters Committee, 489 U.S. at 762-63 (citations omitted). 
See also Painting Indus., 26 F.3d at 1482 ("We cannot limit 
our evaluation of the effects of disclosure to the requesting 
party's particular purpose in seeking disclosure. We must 
evaluate both public benefit and the potential invasion of 
privacy by looking at the nature of the information 
requested and the uses to which it could be put if released 
to any member of the public"); Painting and Drywall Work 
Preservation Fund, Inc. v. Dep't of Hous. and Urban Dev., 
936 F.2d 1300, 1302 (D.C. Cir. 1991) ("Reporters Committee 
defines privacy as encompassing `the individual's control of 
information concerning his or her person.' That information 
includes the prosaic . . . as well as the intimate and 
potentially embarrassing"). 
 
Section 552(b)(7)(C) "provides greater protection from 
disclosure than exemption 6." Sheet Metal Workers', Local 
No. 9, 63 F.3d at 996 (citation omitted). See also Dep't of 
Defense, 510 U.S. at 496 n.6 ("Reporters Committee 
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provides the same guidance in making this identification in 
Exemption 7(C) and Exemption 6 cases"); Reporters 
Committee, 489 U.S. at 756 ("the standard for evaluating a 
threatened invasion of privacy interests resulting from the 
disclosure of records compiled for law enforcement 
purposes is somewhat broader than the standard 
applicable to personnel, medical, and similar files"); 
Hopkins, 929 F.2d at 87 n.5 ("While Reporters Committee 
dealt with Exemption 7(C), its teachings apply to the 
analogous provisions of Exemption 6 as well") (citation 
omitted). 
 
Because S 552(b)(7)(C) provides greater protection, our 
analysis of S 552(b)(6) obviates the need to examine the 
Department of Veterans Affairs's S 552(b)(7)(C) argument. 
See Sheet Metal Workers', Local No. 9, 63 F.3d at 998-99 
("Because we hold that exemption 6 protects the 
information sought from disclosure, we need not address 
whether the more protective provisions of exemption 7(C) 
would also prevent disclosure of that information"); Painting 
Indus., 26 F.3d at 1486 ("Because we hold that Exemption 
6 justifies the government's action in providing redacted 
copies of certified payroll records requested by the labor 
organizations, we need not reach the Exception 7(C) issue"). 
 
B. 
 
1. 
 
At present, International Bhd. of Elec. Workers Local 
Union No. 5 v. United States Dep't of Hous. and Urban Dev., 
852 F.2d 87 (3d Cir. 1988), provides the rule of decision in 
this circuit. In IBEW, the union asked the Department of 
Housing and Urban Development to release the names, 
addresses, and Social Security numbers of non-union 
employees working for a federal HUD contractor. HUD 
furnished the payroll records, which included the 
employees' work classifications, hours worked, rates of pay, 
and gross and net pay levels. But citing the S 552(b)(6) 
privacy exemption, HUD deleted the employees' names, 
home addresses, and Social Security numbers. The district 
court granted summary judgment to the union, compelling 
HUD to furnish this information. 
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We described the appropriate appellate inquiry as follows: 
"to determine whether the information sought is subject to 
privacy protection and, if so, whether the invasion of 
privacy is `clearly warranted.' This inquiry involves a 
balancing of public interest served by disclosure against the 
harm resulting from the invasion of privacy." IBEW, 852 
F.2d at 89. 
 
With respect to the Social Security numbers, we found a 
strong privacy interest: "the extensive use of Social Security 
numbers as universal identifiers in both the public and 
private sectors is one of the most serious manifestations of 
privacy concerns in the nation." Id. (citations omitted). We 
failed to discover any countervailing public interest 
justifying their release: "the Union has offered no public 
interest that would be furthered by the release of the Social 
Security numbers . . . . Faced with an identifiable privacy 
interest, we must conclude that the release of the Social 
Security numbers would constitute a clearly warranted 
invasion of privacy and is therefore barred by exemption 6." 
Id. 
 
But release of the names and addresses, we thought, 
implicated different privacy concerns: 
 
       First . . . individuals generally have a meaningful 
       interest in the privacy of information concerning their 
       homes which merits some protection. In particular, 
       individuals have some privacy interest in their home 
       addresses, although the invasion of privacy effected by 
       such disclosure is not as serious as it would be by the 
       disclosure of more personal information. Second, the 
       employees have a privacy interest in their salaries. This 
       interest is not as great for employees of federal 
       contractors as for other employees, however, since the 
       Davis Bacon Act requires the posting of wage scales at 
       the job site. Although it is true that the posted wage 
       scales link wages with positions rather than names, 
       thereby preserving some degree of privacy in salary 
       levels, the posting nevertheless reduces the workers 
       reasonable expectation of privacy in their salaries. 
 
Id. (citation omitted). 
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We found the union's ability to monitor a contractor's 
compliance with -- and the awarding agencys' enforcement 
of -- the Davis-Bacon Act a sufficiently strong 
countervailing public interest to warrant disclosure. 
 
       [I]f the release of names and addresses of employees of 
       government contractors makes it more likely that 
       contractors will abide by the Act's requirements, the 
       release of the information is in the public interest. 
 
        Although the redacted wage reports would in some 
       cases enable the Union to detect violations of the 
       Davis-Bacon Act, they provide no means for auditing 
       the representations of the contractor. If the contractor 
       misrepresents his weekly wage information, the only 
       way to determine if the Davis-Bacon act is being 
       violated is to contact the contractor's employees and to 
       compare their responses to those given by the 
       contractor. We conclude, therefore, that the release of 
       the names and addresses would facilitate the Union's 
       investigation of possible Davis-Bacon Act violations, 
       and thereby would further the public interest. 
 
* * * 
 
       [T]he mere fact that federal agencies are directly 
       responsible for enforcing the Davis-Bacon Act does not 
       mean that the Union has no role to play in furthering 
       the public interest. If enforcement of the Act is in the 
       public interest, then more effective enforcement of the 
       Act is also in the public interest. 
 
* * * 
 
        Moreover, the Union's interest in monitoring HUD's 
       enforcement of the Davis Bacon Act is exactly the kind 
       of public interest Congress intended FOIA to facilitate. 
 
* * * 
 
       The Union need not show that the information it seeks 
       will in fact prove useful . . . . the fact that the Union 
       has a proprietary interest in protecting its wages does 
       not diminish the public interest in the use of the 
       names and addresses to enhance Davis-Bacon Act 
       enforcement. In addition, we note that HUD has 
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       neither offered an argument nor presented evidence 
       that the Union seeks the information only as a 
       subterfuge to harass nonunion members or to solicit 
       new membership. Absent such a challenge, we must 
       accept the Union's stated purpose in seeking the 
       names and addresses. 
 
Id. at 90-92 (citations and internal quotations omitted). 
 
2. 
 
Subsequent to our decision in IBEW, the United States 
Supreme Court decided two cases which attached more 
significance to the privacy interests of employees, United 
States Dep't of Justice et al. v. Reporters Committee For 
Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749 (1989), and United 
States Dep't of Defense, et al. v. Federal Labor Relations 
Auth., 510 U.S. 487 (1994). In Reporters Committee, a news 
correspondent and the Reporters Committee for Freedom of 
the Press unsuccessfully requested "rap sheets" -- 
documents containing descriptive information as well as a 
history of arrests, charges, convictions, and incarcerations 
-- from the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Finding the 
privacy interests of private citizens with rap sheets 
outweighed any public interest served by disclosure, the 
Supreme Court concluded S 552(b)(7)(C) allowed the FBI to 
withhold the requested information: 
 
        The privacy interest in maintaining the practical 
       obscurity of rap-sheet information will always be high. 
       When the subject of such rap sheet is a private citizen 
       and when the information is in the Government's 
       control as a compilation, rather than as a record of 
       `what the Government is up to,' the privacy interest 
       protected by Exemption 7(C) is in fact at its apex while 
       the FOIA based public interest in disclosure is at its 
       nadir. Such a disparity on the scales of justice holds 
       for a class of cases without regard to individual 
       circumstances; the standard virtues of bright line rules 
       are thus present, and the difficulties attendant to ad 
       hoc adjudication may be avoided. Accordingly, we hold 
       as a categorical matter that a third party's request for 
       law enforcement records or information about a private 
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       citizen can reasonably be expected to invade that 
       citizen's privacy, and that when the request seeks`no 
       official information' about a government agency, but 
       merely records that the Government happens to be 
       storing, the invasion of privacy is `unwarranted.' 
 
Reporters Committee, 489 U.S. at 780. 
 
In Dep't of Defense, the Supreme Court decided "whether 
disclosure of the home addresses of federal civil service 
employees by their employing agency pursuant to a request 
made by the employees' collective bargaining representative 
under the Federal Service Labor Management Relations 
Statute . . . would constitute a clearly unwarranted 
invasion of the employees' personal privacy." Dep't of 
Defense, 510 U.S. at 489. The Supreme Court characterized 
the public interest in disclosure of the addresses as 
"negligible": "Disclosure of the addresses might allow the 
unions to communicate more effectively with employees, 
but it would not appreciably further the citizens right to be 
informed about what their government is up to. Indeed, 
such disclosure would reveal little or nothing about the 
employing agencies or their activities." Id. at 497. 
 
The employees' privacy interests in the non-disclosure of 
their home addresses, however, caused greater concern: 
 
       Because a very slight privacy interest would suffice to 
       outweigh the relevant public interest, we need not be 
       exact in our quantification of the privacy interest. It is 
       enough for present purposes to observe that the 
       employees' interest in nondisclosure is not 
       insubstantial. 
 
* * * 
 
       Whatever the reason that these employees have chosen 
       not to become members of the union or to provide the 
       union with their addresses, however, it is clear that 
       they have some non trivial privacy interest in 
       nondisclosure, and in avoiding the influx of union 
       related mail, and, perhaps, union related telephone 
       calls or visits, that would follow disclosure. 
 
        Many people simply do not want to be disturbed at 
       home by work related matters. Employees can lessen 
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       the chance of such unwanted contacts by not revealing 
       their addresses to their exclusive representative. 
       Even if the direct union /employee communication 
       facilitated by the disclosure of home addresses were 
       limited to mailings, this does not lessen the interest 
       that individuals have in preventing at least some 
       unsolicited, unwanted mail from reaching them at their 
       homes. We are reluctant to disparage the privacy of the 
       home, which is accorded special consideration in our 
       Constitution, laws, and traditions. Moreover, when we 
       consider that other parties, such as commercial 
       advertisers and solicitors, must have the same access 
       under FOIA as the unions to the employee address lists 
       sought in this case it is clear that the individual 
       privacy interest that would be protected by 
       nondisclosure is far from insignificant. 
 
Id. at 500-01. 
 
Reporters Committee and Dep't of Defense demonstrate 
both an increased appreciation for employees' privacy and 
a concomitant decrease in the belief that disclosure of 
personal information for the purpose of monitoring Davis- 
Bacon Act compliance serves a public interest. 
 
3. 
 
Courts of appeals decisions following Reporters Committee 
and Dep't of Defense express the same view with respect to 
the relevant private and public interests. In Sheet Metal 
Workers Int'l Assoc. Local No. 9 v. United States Air Force, 
63 F.3d 994 (10th Cir. 1995), the Court of Appeals for the 
Tenth Circuit absolved the United States Air Force from an 
obligation to release individual names with certified payrolls 
and apprentice registration lists. 
 
        [T]hree circuits have held that employees of private 
       contractors performing federal construction projects 
       have a substantial privacy interest in personalfinancial 
       information with personal identifiers linking the 
       individual to the financial information. They have 
       further held that that interest outweighs any 
       recognized public interest in the disclosure of such 
       information. Whether viewed as relevant to the 
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       magnitude of the privacy interest at issue, or to the 
       appropriate balance between that interest and the 
       public interest in disclosure, we see no principled 
       distinction between names alone as personal 
       identifiers, or names and addresses. Either one 
       provides the critical connection between personal 
       information and the individual to whom that 
       information relates. 
 
Id. at 998. 
 
Painting Indus. of Haw. Market Recovery Fund v. United 
States Dep't of Air Force, 26 F.3d 1479 (9th Cir. 1994) 
considered similar information private: 
 
       In the cases before us, requesters seek a list of people 
       engaged in the construction trade, broken into their 
       particular occupational classification. Undoubtedly, 
       such a list would be of interest to people working in 
       the construction trades . . . . [T]here is a substantial 
       probability that the disclosure will lead to the use of 
       the list by marketers and a concomitant invasion of the 
       workers' right to be let alone. 
 
* * * 
 
        The requesters here not only seek names and 
       addresses, but also particularized information about 
       wages. We agree with those circuits that have 
       considered the issue that significant privacy interests 
       are implicated by the release of this information. 
 
Id. at 1483-85 (citations omitted). 
 
Painting and Drywall Work Preservation Fund, Inc. v. 
Department of Hous. and Urban Dev., 936 F.2d 1300 (D.C. 
Cir. 1991) reached a similar result with respect to a 
Freedom of Information Act request to HUD to supply 
certified payrolls. Although HUD supplied the records, it 
invoked S 552(b)(6) and withheld names, Social Security 
numbers, and home addresses. The Court of Appeals for 
the District of Columbia Circuit found disclosure would 
invade the employees' privacy, contravening the purpose of 
the Freedom of Information Act: "If we were tofind that the 
Fund is entitled to receive the information sought, the 
workers would experience a significant diminution in their 
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expectations of privacy because that same information 
would also have to be provided, for example, to creditors, 
salesmen, and union organizers." Id. at 1303 (citation 
omitted). The possibility of this intrusion outweighed any 
public interest in disclosure: "As information that might 
reveal the failure of contractors to comply with relevant 
laws does not in itself cast light on what HUD is up to, we 
can find no obvious public interest in its disclosure that is 
relevant to this analysis." Id. (citation omitted). 
 
In Hopkins v. United States Dep't of Hous. and Urban 
Dev., 929 F.2d 81 (2d Cir. 1991) the union requested 
certified payroll records from HUD to monitor Davis-Bacon 
Act compliance. Relying on S 552(b)(6), HUD deleted all 
employee names, addresses, and Social Security numbers. 
 
Siding with HUD, the Court of Appeals for the Second 
Circuit found "individual private employees have a 
significant privacy interest in avoiding disclosure of their 
names and addresses, particularly where, as here, the 
names and addresses would be coupled with personal 
financial information." Id. at 87 (citations omitted). The 
court ultimately considered disclosure unwarranted: 
 
       disclosure of the names and addresses sought by 
       appellant would shed no light on HUD's performance in 
       enforcing the prevailing wage laws. Rather, disclosure 
       of this information would serve the public interest only 
       insofar as it would allow the Union to contact 
       individual employees, who may then dispute the 
       accuracy of the data reflected in the records, and so 
       reveal violations of the prevailing wage laws that HUD, 
       through proper diligence, should have detected. Were 
       we to compel disclosure of personal information with so 
       attenuated a relationship to governmental activity, 
       however, we would open the door to disclosure of 
       virtually all personal information, thereby eviscerating 
       the FOIA privacy exemptions. 
 
Id. at 88 (citations omitted). According to Hopkins, the 
public interest served by disclosure was not outweighed 
by the employees' privacy interests "in controlling 
dissemination of their names, addresses and wage 
information. Indeed, the likelihood that the union would 
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use the requested identifying information to contact 
employees at their homes dramatically increases the 
already significant threat to the employees privacy interests 
that disclosure of this information would entail." Id. 
(citation omitted). 
 
C. 
 
1. 
 
After considering the views expressed by the Supreme 
Court in Reporters Committee and Dep't of Defense and 
reviewing the recent decisions from other courts of appeals, 
we believe we should modify our decision in IBEW. 
Generally, "a panel of this court is bound by, and lacks 
authority to overrule, a published decision of a prior panel." 
Reich v. D.M. Sabia Co., 90 F.3d 854, 858 (3d Cir. 1996) 
(citations omitted).4 Nonetheless, "a panel may reevaluate a 
precedent in light of intervening authority and amendments 
to statutes or regulations. Our sister circuits abide by that 
self-same principle." Id. (citing, inter alia, Williams v. 
Ashland Eng'g Co., 45 F.3d 588, 592 (1st Cir.)("An existing 
panel decision may be undermined by controlling authority, 
subsequently announced, such as an opinion of the 
Supreme Court, an en banc opinion of the circuit court, or 
a statutory overruling"), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 51 (1995)). 
See also Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 947 F.2d 
682, 698 (3d Cir. 1991) ("a change [by the Supreme Court] 
in the legal test or standard governing a particular area is 
a change binding on lower courts that makes results 
reached under a repudiated legal standard no longer 
binding"), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
 
Although the intervening decisions from the Supreme 
Court in Reporters Committee and Dep't of Defense do not 
answer the precise issue presented here, their reasoning 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. See Third Circuit I.O.P. 9.1 ("It is the tradition of this court that 
the 
holding of a panel in a reported opinion is binding on subsequent 
panels. Thus, no subsequent panel overrules the holding in a published 
opinion of a previous panel. Court in banc consideration is required to 
do so"). 
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and holdings clearly counsel re-examination of our 
reasoning and holdings in IBEW.5  
 
2. 
 
The union contends there is a strong public interest in 
monitoring agency enforcement of the prevailing wage law 
because the information sought contributes significantly to 
public understanding of the operations or activities of the 
government. Congress, the union argues, enacted both the 
Davis-Bacon Act and the Copeland Act to facilitate 
regulation of contractors. According to the union, the 
records requested would make it easier to rectify any 
mistake or omission that government agencies might make 
during such enforcement activities. Redacted payrolls, the 
union complains, require blind acceptance of the 
contractor's unverifiable reports. 
 
Furthermore, the union characterizes the employees' 
privacy interest as insignificant because (1) the addresses 
are available from other public sources; (2) the employees' 
wage scales are posted publicly at the job site; and (3) the 
employees received no promises of confidentiality with 
respect to the requested data. 
 
a. 
 
We believe the union overestimates the public interest to 
be served by disclosure. "[T]he only relevant public interest 
in disclosure to be weighed . . . is the extent to which 
disclosure would serve the core purpose of the FOIA, which 
is contributing significantly to public understanding of the 
operations or activities of the government." Dep't of 
Defense, 510 U.S. at 495 (citations omitted). The release of 
names, addresses, and similar "private" information reveals 
little, if anything, about the operations of the Department of 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. We are not alone in recognizing that the conclusion reached in IBEW 
has been superseded by Supreme Court authority. See Painting and 
Drywall, 936 F.2d at 1303 (IBEW "predated Reporters Committee and is 
therefore of `doubtful authority' ") (citation omitted); Hopkins, 929 F.2d 
at 
87 (IBEW "[w]as decided prior to Reporters Committee . . . and [is] of 
doubtful authority in light of that opinion"). 
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Veterans Affairs. See id. at 497 ("Disclosure of the 
addresses . . . would not appreciably further the citizens' 
right to be informed about what their government is up to. 
Indeed, such disclosure would reveal little or nothing about 
the employing agencies or their activities"); Painting Indus., 
26 F.3d at 1486 (referring to "the marginal additional 
usefulness that the names and addresses would serve in 
uncovering `what the government is up to' "); Painting and 
Drywall, 936 F.2d at 1303 ("As information that might 
reveal the failure of contractors to comply with relevant 
laws does not in itself cast light on what HUD is up to, we 
can find no obvious public interest in its disclosure that is 
relevant to this analysis"); Hopkins, 929 F.2d at 88 
("disclosure of the names and addresses sought by 
appellant would shed no light on HUD's performance in 
enforcing prevailing wage laws . . . . [but] would serve the 
public interest only insofar as it would allow the Union to 
contact individual employees"). 
 
It would appear that since our decision in IBEW nine 
years ago, the Supreme Court has refined and reformulated 
the applicable standard measuring the "core purpose" of 
the Freedom of Information Act, namely contributing 
significantly to public understanding of the operations or 
activities of government. After the decisions in Reporters 
Committee and Department of Defense, no court of appeals 
has given much weight to the monitoring function. We are 
compelled to do likewise. In a broad sense of course, the 
public has an interest in whether a federal agency fairly 
and adequately enforces prevailing wage laws. See Hopkins, 
929 F.2d at 88 ("While assertions of public interest in 
`monitoring' government operations `have not been viewed 
favorably by the courts,' we accept this interest as within 
the ambit of public interest recognized in Reporters 
Committee") (citations omitted). But even assuming 
"monitoring" government operations, to some degree falls 
within the scope of public interest enunciated in Reporters 
Committee, in this case, providing the requested 
information -- the names and addresses of the individual 
workers -- would not enhance agency enforcement of 
prevailing wage laws. 
 
Some Davis-Bacon Act violations appear clearly on the 
face of the payroll records regardless whether names are 
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shown, e.g., the payment of a properly classified worker at 
a lower rate than the prevailing rate for their classification. 
To insure compliance, the union need only compare job 
classifications to pay rates to determine if the contractor 
pays its employees the prevailing wage. Furthermore, other 
violations remain undetected irrespective whether names 
appear, e.g., (1) the improper classification of a worker 
which results in payment at a lower than prevailing rate; 
and (2) the proper classification and compensation of a 
worker who then pays the contractor a "kick-back." 
Divulging names and addresses will have no beneficial 
effect on the union's ability to detect these violations. 
 
Moreover, the ability of the union to determine whether 
private contractors pay their workers prevailing wages does 
not mean that unlimited disclosure of payroll records is in 
the public interest. See Hopkins, 929 F.2d at 88 ("whatever 
public interest there may be in knowing whether private 
parties are violating the law is not the sort of public interest 
advanced by the FOIA, and has no weight in Exemption 6 
balancing"). We are reluctant to overstate the public 
interest served by disclosure in light of diminishing 
importance attributed to the monitoring function and the 
unproven ability of the requested information to assist in 
the enforcement of prevailing wage laws. Disclosure will not 
contribute significantly to the public's understanding of 
government activities. 
 
We also believe the union enjoys alternate, less intrusive, 
methods by which it may collect the desired information 
including, but not limited to, (1) dispensing fliers to workers 
as they arrive and leave job sites or posting signs or 
advertisements designed to solicit information from workers 
about possible wage law violations, and (2) using existing 
information to compare job classifications with pay rates. 
See Painting Indus., 26 F.3d at 1485 ("The requesters here 
have less intrusive means of procuring the information they 
seek than having the government disgorge private 
information from its files"); Painting and Drywall, 936 F.2d 
at 1303 ("the Fund has an alternative means of access to 
current workers -- face to face conversation") (citation 
omitted). 
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b. 
 
Against a weak public interest in disclosure, we weigh the 
private interest of employees in non-disclosure of their 
names and addresses. We begin by noting that under the 
more recent standards articulated by the Supreme Court in 
Reporters Committee and Dep't of Defense, our opinion in 
IBEW may have underestimated the importance of 
employees' privacy interests violated by the dissemination 
of this information. Recent appellate decisions have also 
underscored the substantiality of that interest and afforded 
it greater weight in the balancing process. 
 
Proliferation of information about private citizens 
implicates neither the spirit nor the purpose of the Freedom 
of Information Act. See Reporters Committee, 489 U.S. at 
765-66 ("[D]isclosure of records regarding private citizens, 
identifiable by name, is not what the framers of the FOIA 
had in mind . . . . provisions, for deletion of identifying 
references . . . reflect a congressional understanding that 
disclosure of records containing personal details about 
private citizens can infringe significant privacy interests"); 
Painting and Drywall, 936 F.2d at 1303 ("The dissemination 
of this sort of information about private citizens is not what 
the framers of the FOIA had in mind") (citation omitted); 
Hopkins, 929 F.2d at 88 ("Were we to compel disclosure of 
personal information with so attenuated a relationship to 
governmental activity, however, we would open the door to 
disclosure of virtually all personal information, thereby 
eviscerating the FOIA privacy exemptions"). 
 
We recognize the Supreme Court described the interest of 
bargaining unit employees in non-disclosure of their home 
addresses only as "not insubstantial." Dep't of Defense, 510 
U.S. at 500. Nonetheless, even a slight privacy interest will 
tip the scales in favor of non-disclosure. See id. ("Because 
a very slight privacy interest would suffice to outweigh the 
relevant public interest, we need not be exact in our 
quantification of the privacy interest"). 
 
The significant privacy concerns attached to the home 
and employees' interest in avoiding a barrage of unsolicited 
contact weighs heavily in our consideration. See id. at 501 
("[employees] have some non-trivial privacy interest in 
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nondisclosure, and in avoiding the influx of union-related 
mail, and, perhaps, union-related telephone calls or visits, 
that would follow disclosure . . . . We are reluctant to 
disparage the privacy of the home, which is accorded 
special consideration in our Constitution, laws, and 
traditions") (citations omitted) (emphasis deleted); Hopkins, 
929 F.2d at 88 ("the likelihood that the Union would use 
the requested identifying information to contact employees 
at their homes dramatically increases the already 
significant threat to the employees' privacy interests that 
disclosure of this information would entail"). 
 
At the same time, we find unconvincing the union's 
argument that employees have waived their privacy rights 
because their addresses are available from other public 
sources and are posted publicly at the job site. 
 
       It is true that home addresses often are publicly 
       available through sources such as telephone directories 
       and voter registration lists, but in an organized society, 
       there are few facts that are not at one time or another 
       divulged to another. The privacy interest protected by 
       Exemption 6 encompasses the individuals' control of 
       information concerning his or her person. An 
       individual's interest in controlling the dissemination of 
       information regarding personal matters does not 
       dissolve simply because that information may be 
       available to the public in some forum. 
 
Dep't of Defense, 510 U.S. at 500. 
 
Once the union receives this information, there is no bar 
to others having unlimited access to it. See id. at 496 
("Congress clearly intended to give any member of the 
public as much right to disclosure as one with a special 
interest in a particular document . . . the identity of the 
requesting party has no bearing on the merits of his or her 
FOIA request") (citation omitted). It is possible that the 
information requested may be misappropriated by 
marketers, creditors, solicitors, and commercial advertisers, 
eroding the employees' expectation of privacy. See id. at 
501 ("when we consider that other parties, such as 
commercial advertisers and solicitors, must have the same 
access under FOIA as the unions to the employee address 
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lists . . . it is clear that the individual privacy interest that 
would be protected by nondisclosure is far from 
insignificant"); Painting Indus., 26 F.3d at 1483 ("there is a 
substantial probability that disclosure will lead to the use 
of the list by marketers and a concomitant invasion of the 
workers' right to be let alone"); Painting and Drywall, 936 
F.2d at 1303 (if "we were to find that the Fund is entitled 
to receive the information sought, the workers would 
experience a significant diminution in their expectations of 
privacy because that same information would also have to 
be provided, for example, to creditors, salesmen, and union 
organizers"). The prospect of this unwarranted intrusion 
counsels against disclosure. 
 
IV. 
 
The privacy interest of employees in the non-disclosure of 
their names and addresses substantially outweighs the 
slight public interest put forth by the union. Dissemination 
of the requested data to the union would ultimately result 
in an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy. To the 
extent that releasing this information serves a public 
interest, it is too attenuated to warrant a contrary result. 
Any other conclusion would be at odds with the core 
purpose of the Freedom of Information Act, namely a 
significant contribution to public understanding of the 
operations or activities of the government. 
 
The Department of Veterans Affairs may redact the 
names, Social Security numbers, and addresses of Boro 
employees from the information requested by the union. 
 
Accordingly, we will reverse the judgment of the district 
court and remand with directions to enter judgment in 
favor of the Department of Veterans Affairs. 
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